During the meeting you must decide whether to focus on weapons development, or higher Synth production. Allocating resources to weapons development will allow for better arms in the fight ahead, while putting manpower towards Synth production will increase the defensive reinforcements available to you in the near future. Once the meeting is over, the quest concludes.
I thought these guys were supposed to be the most technologically advanced faction in the game, their laser weaponry is absolute garbage compared to a standard laser weapon! I mean how are these guys even a threat? I get that synths have more combat prowess than the average wastelander but come on, unless your up against a courser you shouldn't need more than a merc or two to take down half a dozen of them. Danse can take down scores of em
I'm pretty sure the first and second gen synths we see scouring places are designed more as mass-produced shock troops than highly advanced individual units... I mean, an Assaultron is a more deadly opponent than a single synth. But rarely do you encounter just a single synth. By that logic, it would make sense for the Institute to mass produce a ton of cheap but efficient weapons for their synths to use. The Institute Gun is highly modifiable, only just barely weaker than a standard Laser Rifle, and presumably much easier to mass-produce and maintain.
The institute wants to help the Commonwealth, and has not developed much into weaponry. However, SPOILER ALERT, very late in the institute quest line, you get to chose to either produce more synths or develop better weapons.
Tho if you side with the Institute at the end, they ask you as a Director wether they should focus on weapon manufacturing or synth production and if you answer weapons, they hint that they want to move on to plasma weaponary. There's also a chick scientist who is developing plasma weaponary in her spare time.
However that's still plenty of damage if you are at the receiving end so I would not say institute weapons are weak. Institute synth with rifle can kill you in 8 seconds while he would require 7 if he had laser riffle (given you wear 20DR worth of armor and have 100 hit points). That's not that huge practical difference. One second more.
I have Rifleman maxed and a few other sneak and luck damage perks. I find it hard to beat even a non-legendary Gauss rifle. I did finally find a synth rifle that had +50 (+100 with perks) rad damage and gave it a spin. Even on targets with no radiation resistance it did less damage than a standard laser rifle. Either the resistances in vats are off, there are some damage bugs, or some damage types are just better than others period. I mod all my weapons to max non-auto states.
Why is the institute's weaponry weak? Because their synth armor are usually pretty tough. Balance in motion. Also it is the reason I have not seen any BoS member yet using a plasma weapon when they should have them in their stores.
Sarin (NATO designation GB [short for G-series, "B"]) is an extremely toxic synthetic organophosphorus compound. A colourless, odourless liquid, it is used as a chemical weapon due to its extreme potency as a nerve agent. Exposure is lethal even at very low concentrations, where death can occur within one to ten minutes after direct inhalation of a lethal dose, due to suffocation from respiratory paralysis, unless antidotes are quickly administered. People who absorb a non-lethal dose and do not receive immediate medical treatment may suffer permanent neurological damage.
This uncertainty stems from the fact that monitoring clandestine BW programmes is a challenging task for several reasons. First, BW development and production capabilities can be concealed at ostensibly legitimate industrial sites, such as vaccine plants or facilities for the production of single-cell protein or biopesticide. Second, the equipment and know-how needed for the manufacture of BW agents is entirely dual-use, although technologies for weaponization and delivery are more specialized. Third, because only tens of kilograms of an agent such as dried anthrax spores can be militarily significant, even small-scale production facilities are relevant from a security standpoint. Fourth, proliferant states often use deception and denial techniques to conceal their BW-related activities, as was demonstrated by the cat-and-mouse game played by Iraq and United Nations biological weapons inspectors after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Finally, since the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent mailing of letters contaminated with anthrax bacterial spores, the biodefence programmes of several countries have expanded dramatically, providing a potential cover for offensive BW development.
Also of growing interest to the pharmaceutical industry are bioregulators, natural body chemicals that play a key role in many physiological processes, such as the regulation of temperature, blood pressure, immunity, and brain function. Although these biochemicals are essential for life at extremely low concentrations, they can be toxic at higher doses or when their molecular structure is modified. Neuropeptides, a class of bioregulators in the central nervous system, are known to affect cognition and emotion. These compounds might therefore be developed into a new class of potent incapacitating agents with potential applications in law enforcement, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorist operations. If such biochemical agents prove to be tactically useful, countries might well be motivated to acquire and weaponize them, a development that would seriously undermine the biological and chemical disarmament regimes .
Advanced DNA synthesis techniques have also made it possible to reconstitute entire microbial genomes by strictly chemical means, a feat that has been accomplished to date for poliovirus, the 1918 Spanish influenza virus, a SARS-like coronavirus, and a small bacterium . In the future, whole-genome synthesis techniques will make it possible to construct any pathogenic virus for which an accurate genetic sequence has been determined, including the smallpox virus, which was eradicated from nature in the late 1970s by a global vaccination campaign under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO). Because smallpox eradication led countries around the world to stop vaccinating their civilian populations against the disease in the early 1980s, the human population has since become increasingly vulnerable to the deliberate use of smallpox as a biological weapon. Although the known stocks of the smallpox virus are currently held at two WHO-approved repositories in the United States and Russia, the CIA reportedly believes that undeclared cashes of the virus may exist in countries of BW proliferation concern, including Russia, Iran, and North Korea .
When the natural rubber supply from Southeast Asia was cut off at the beginning of World War II, the United States and its allies faced the loss of a strategic material. With U.S. government sponsorship, a consortium of companies involved in rubber research and production united in a unique spirit of technical cooperation and dedication to produce a general purpose synthetic rubber, GR-S (Government Rubber-Styrene), on a commercial scale. In Akron and other U.S. locations, these companies, in collaboration with a network of researchers in government, academic, and industrial laboratories, developed and manufactured in record time enough synthetic rubber to meet the needs of the U.S. and its allies during World War II.
In 1906 scientists at the Bayer Company in Germany embarked on a program to make synthetic rubber. By 1912, they were producing methyl rubber, made by polymerizing methylisoprene. Methyl rubber was manufactured on a large scale during World War I, when a blockade halted the import of natural rubber to Germany. Because methyl rubber was an expensive and inferior imitation, production was abandoned at the war's end.
Because of its working relationship with I. G. Farben, the giant oil company Standard Oil of New Jersey (Jersey Standard) was an important go-between in the transatlantic transfer of synthetic rubber technology. In the early 1930s, chemists at Jersey Standard began research and development on the production of butadiene from petroleum. Their work involved dehydrogenation, a reaction that removes hydrogen atoms from hydrocarbon molecules. The discovery of catalysts to accelerate the reaction, along with purification procedures and process modifications, allowed large-scale production of butadiene. The company, under the leadership of Frank A. Howard, entered into agreements with I. G. Farben and, through the Joint American Study Company, exchanged technical information on synthetic rubber and other developments. Jersey Standard also had limited development rights for Buna S and administered the patents in the United States after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939. Because GR-S is similar to Buna S, this technology proved crucial to solving the rubber crisis facing the United States during WWII.
In the United States, research and development to produce an all-purpose substitute for natural rubber was dominated by the big four rubber companies, The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company (Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.), The B. F. Goodrich Company, The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, and United States Rubber Company (Uniroyal Chemical Company, Inc.). Their collective technical knowledge was significant to the successful outcome of the synthetic rubber program.
After the loss of the natural rubber supply, the RRC called for an annual production of 400,000 tons of general purpose synthetic rubber to be manufactured by the four large rubber companies. On December 19, 1941, Jersey Standard, Firestone, Goodrich, Goodyear, and United States Rubber Company signed a patent and information sharing agreement under the auspices of the RRC. 2b1af7f3a8